In the world of microfinance, interest rate ethics is an important issue, thrown into the limelight by the Initial Public Offering of Compartamos which resulted in millions of dollars of gains, some of which found their way into private pockets. These high gains were based on high interest rates, raising ethical questions. The paper then uses a stakeholder analysis to explain the interests of different stakeholders in this case and present that fairness to one group of stakeholders is often at the expense of another group. We take the position that in this case, specifically, the firm objectives could have been met without such ethical tradeoffs. The specifics of the case are then generalised to all NGOs participating in for-profit firms. 
Introduction
Microfinance is today a well-known instrument in development policies. With between $800 million and $1 billion to microfinance of subsidies per year (2004) and more than $5 billion of assets under management at the end of 2007 mainly through socially-driven investment funds (CGAP, 2008) , donors and social investors contribute to the boom of the sector.
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) have reached more than 130 millions clients, most of them previously excluded from the traditional financial sector 1 (Daley-Harris, 2008) . The Mexican MFI named Banco Compartamos is one of its most famous and controversial leaders.
At the end of 2005, Compartamos was charging high interest rates of 86% p.a., net of taxes on its loans to the poor 2 . This strategy led to high profitability and a booming book value of the shares that reached 21 times the paid-in-capital by December 2006. The Return on Equity was higher than 50% p.a., much more than the Mexican banking sector and that of most MFIs in the rest of the world, causing the growth rate in outreach to double from Bank group. Private individuals, who held a minority of shares, captured over $150 million from the sale. The backlash to the issue was a lot of accusations that poor people paying very high interest rates were sacrificed for rich investors. For instance, immediately after the IPO, Lewis (2007) , wondered if the IPO is "a warning that microfinance is going awry". On the other hand, the Compartamos IPO has served to bring a massive private sector infusion of investment to alleviate poverty (Rhyne & Guimon, 2007) . This paper will discuss some ethical questions related to Compartamos strategy. We will argue that Compartamos strategy favored some stakeholders, primarily the shareholders and to a lesser extent the staff and the potential borrowers who could benefit from the expansion of the MFI. Nevertheless, this strategy was endured at the expense of another key stakeholder, their current clientele. The IPO principally contributed to the shareholders interest rather than 3 the potential borrower since it did not lead to a capital increase but only the sale of existing shares.
These ethical issues stem from governance problems, which are thorny in the best of times, and the paper will zoom in upon conflicts between different types of shareholders with diverging missions, which make the resolution of stakeholder problems more difficult. This paper is not directly dealing with problems of ethics in money per se (ethics of making money, ethics of using money, etc.). Nor is it directly dealing with the ethics of for-profit, capitalist, banks making profits by selling finance to poor people at the bottom of the pyramid. We will argue that Banco Compartamos story is a much more complicated case since it is governed and primarily owned by not-for-profit NGOs or developmental institutes.
Hence, it raises ethical questions on the role and the missions of non-profit or sociallyoriented associations and enterprises. In this paper, we will focus on the history of
Compartamos before and just after the 2007 IPO. The IPO launched a controversy that affected the whole microfinance sector and forced the managers to decrease interest rates afterwards.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the facts of the Compartamos case up to the IPO in April 2007. Section 3 will address the ethical questions of choosing between stakeholders implicit in Compartamos' interest rates and their profitability.
Broadening the debate to the whole non-profit sector, Section 4 will present some ethical issues raised in the governance of microfinance institutions in particular and NGOs in general when shareholders have diverging motives between themselves. Finally, Section 5 will draw some conclusions.
Compartamos history until April 2007
Compartamos AC was an NGO established in 1990 as a not-for-profit institution to provide microcredit to poor people. During the period 1990-2000, this NGO received donor funds of $6.3 million. Donors included the CGAP 3 , a consortium of public and private donors hosted by the World Bank as well as other international donors, as well as the NGO ACCION International, which was financed by the American development agency USAID. Thus, donor 4 agencies were the principals and Compartamos AC was the agent whose mission was to aid the poor by offering them credit.
In 2000, a for-profit finance company named Financiera Compartamos was formed with a paid-in capital of $6 million. The goal was to make the management more professional and aggressive to reach its targeted outreach to ensure financial sustainability thorough economies of scale. The shareholders of Financiera Compartamos included the NGO, Compartamos AC, as well as the equity investment fund Profund, ACCION International and IFC, the private lending arm of the World Bank group. Together, these agencies with development missions had 68% of the shares in the for-profit Financiera Compartamos. These agencies are themselves agents for donors or for tax-payers (Mersland, 2008) . The rest of the shares were predominantly with directors and managers with some outside private holding.
Principal, Agents, Agent's-Agent, Agent's-Agent's-Agent Thus, we can resume that public funds given to agencies were given to an NGO, who in turn invested it in a for-profit agent. As such, the finance company was a for-profit agent of a line of not-for-profit principals, as summarised in Figure 1 . Although this itself raises some governance issues, it must be reminded that many public agencies sub-contract a good part of their mission to private companies. Here, the mission of the development agencies was to raise the standard of the poor. The mission of the Mexican NGO was to raise the standard of 5 the poor by aiding them to get credit. The mission of the for-profit was to give credit to the poor in a financially sustainable manner. The idea was to attain independence from the vagaries of donor financing.
The for-profit Financiera Compartamos really made high profits, primarily from high interest rates. It charged high interest rates of 86% p.a., net of taxes on its loans to the poor.
With VAT, this was almost 100 % p.a. The high interest rates led to high profitability. The World Bank has been under criticism from academics and social workers from all sides saying that their donor funds do not go far enough to foster real growth and development.
Ironically, in this Compartamos case, where the IPO was evidently a huge success with 6 perfect execution, they found themselves being criticised for having initiated too much growth and profits! Within two months, CGAP (through ) and ACCION (Rhyne & Guimon, 2007) published papers in defence of the Banco Compartamos IPO. Compartamos AC also listed arguments in this line on its website.
Fair prices: a stakeholder approach to Compartamos' policy
This section will debate Compartamos' pricing policy considering the diverse stakeholders involved in its activity. After a brief historical and comparative introduction to the fairness issues in interest rates, we will present the key stakeholders. Freeman and Reed (1983) distinguish between a wide definition of stakeholders and a narrow definition. In the wide definition they include "any identifiable group or individual who can affect the achievement of an organization's objectives or who are affected by the achievement of an organization's objectives". In a narrower definition they include "any identifiable group or individual on which the organization is dependent for its continued survival". In this paper, we use the narrow definition. However, alongside the five traditional stakeholders of financial institutions, employees, shareholders, current borrowers, donors and regulators, a sixth one is at the core of this debate on interest rates: the potential borrower 5 . We will show that Compartamos' justification of its pricing strategy appeals to two stakeholders: the shareholders and the potential borrowers, at the expense of existing borrowers.
Stakeholder analysis has now been applied in a number of papers in diverse industries and functional areas such as retailing (Whysall, 2000) , intercollegiate athletics (Wolfe & Putler, 2002) , R & D (Elias, Cavana, & Jackson, 2002; Nystrom & Poon-asawasombat, 2003) , charitable contributions (Brammer & Millington, 2004) and political issues (Bryson, Cunningham, & Lokkesmoe, 2002; Drori & Weizmann, 2007) . In most of these analyses, some common steps are present: a set of stakeholders is first defined, then their interests are indicated, and then a discussion is made of the conflict of interests and the relative power of each stakeholder 6 . The issues chosen are often presented in terms of ethical concerns. For example, in the retailing industry, Whysall (2000) looks at ethical issues such as low pay of retail workshop required for low prices to customers, selling products made in sweatshops in 7 low cost countries, offensive advertising, development of out-of-town outlets, and copy-cat branding. All of these require balancing interests of some of the stakeholders.
All these papers indicate that the Stakeholder Analysis concept is not perfect, but it helps understand the business process, despite some limitations. One limitation is that Stakeholder analysis assumes homogenous preferences within each stakeholder group and this is not always the case (Wolfe & Putler, 2002) . A different formulation of this critique is that role based shareholders may not have the same interests, especially if self-interest is not the primary motivator (Wolfe & Putler, 2002) . In fact, in our own study there are different shareholders with different interests and different donors with different interests. However, this limitation can be answered easily by simply increasing the number of stakeholders in the analysis. A second limitation is that the same stakeholder's interests may be homogenous or heterogeneous for different decisions (Wolfe & Putler, 2002) . In our case, we are mainly looking at issues related to the price and clientele, so we don't face this problem. A third limitation is that stakeholder analysis is too superficial and that to really understand social organizations we need to go deeper and perform an Archetypal Social Systems Analysis (Mitroff, 1983) . However, in our experience managers would suffer from time constraints and bonded rationality to study what is happening in the mind of each and every individual.
Therefore, some kind of superficiality and aggregation is necessary for management decision making.
Nevertheless, despite these limitations, all these studies have opted to adopt stakeholder analysis because of the advantages it provides. On the one hand, by looking beyond shareholders, stakeholder analysis takes in multi-party interests involved in the success or failure of the firm (Freeman & Reed, 1983) . At the other extreme, it simplifies the analysis by grouping interested parties in a few manageable slots (Wolfe & Putler, 2002) . This then allows noting the interests of these groups and the inherent risks in ignoring any group (Bryson et al., 2002) , especially those who control resources that may be critical to the network (Drori & Weizmann, 2007) . The advantages of such analysis increase in complex markets, different stakeholder backgrounds, large investments and perceived risky products (Nystrom & Poon-asawasombat, 2003) and risky environments (Wolfe & Putler, 2002 Western world has slowly been taking away anti-usury laws, so as to allow lenders to take the risk of giving credit to "poor" borrowers, who is to decide the morality of 100% interest rates:
the society (government) or commercial investors? De Sousa Shields (2008) considers that any limit would be arbitrary. In many cases, it anyway entails some political considerations.
The Economist (Aug 19, 2006) reports that Indian government officials considered interest rates of 21.5% charged by SHARE, an Indian MFI to be too high and forced it to reduce them by 4%. This is in a context where the average moneylender was charging more than twice as much.
In France, Attuel-Mendes and Ashta (2008) find that the lifting of usury ceilings has neither increased interest rates nor increased bank micro-lending. Thus, if micro-credit in Mexico is booming at 100% interest rates, why don't banks in France succeed in lending at these rates?
Are ethics and practices being influenced by local culture? Another example of cultural connotations of lending to the poor is Wal-Mart which charges 86% on consumer financing loans in Mexico (Smith & Epstein, 2007) , an interest rate which would shock Americans. Moreover, compared to the sector, Compartamos offers particularly small loans in relation to per capita gross national income 13 . Fixed transaction costs (such as searching for customers and processing the application) are spread over a lower loan size, driving up interest rates.
The following stakeholder analysis must be viewed in the background of such comparative and cultural differences.
A stakeholder analysis of microfinance activities
In following the classical stakeholder analysis methodology (Bryson et al., 2002; Elias et al., 2002; Whysall, 2000; Wolfe & Putler, 2002) , we start by presenting the different stakeholders, then analyse their different interests or stakes, and finally create a power versus interest grid. The discussion comments on this.
There are six different stakeholders prominent in the debate on interest rates sparked by
Compartamos. These include shareholders, donors, regulators, employees, existing borrowers and potential borrowers. In Table 1 , we summarise the objectives of each stakeholder group and, more specifically, what could be expected from each stakeholder as objective with respect to interest rates 14 . We note that shareholders and employees are primarily interested in high interest rates compatible with financial sustainability and growth and that borrowers (both existing and potential), donors and regulators are primarily interested in low interest rates compatible with outreach and impact.
10 In Figure 2 , we present a power versus interest grid. As can be seen, the regulator is powerful, We will now look at the divergent interests of each of these stakeholders and indicate the compromises which require to be made.
The first and maybe most obvious stakeholders are the current clients 16 of the MFI. We have already highlighted the high interest rates charged by Compartamos. Interest rates charged by
MFIs are usually superior to the traditional banks because of the heavy transaction costs of the tiny loans they offer. Worldwide, these, interest rates often range between 25 and 50%.
Compartamos is thus one of the most expensive MFI in the world.
As argued by Armendariz and Morduch (2005) , Compartamos' seems to be somewhat inefficient compared to the other leading MFIs. Since Compartamos charge higher interest rates, clients end up paying for the inefficiency of the institution. Thus there is a trade-off between employee comforts and existing borrowers.
The small loan size partly, but only partly, explains the pricing strategy. For instance, according to analysis, Compartamos could have reduced its interest rate to the range of 65 to 70% while maintaining a level of profitability compared to other banks (e.g., return on equity of 15%). Thus, a second compromise was the question of shareholders' interest versus those of existing borrowers.
12
Historically, Compartamos' interest rates increased during the Mexican financial crisis in 1995, in order to cover additional expenses related to the devaluation and inflation. They however never decreased afterwards when the economic conditions were stabilised. Managers and shareholders were probably very cautious to cover all potential risks that the institution may face, even after the crisis was over but this would then be "at the expense" of the current clients.
Even if the exact impact of these high interest rates is still much debated in the microfinance community, one can anyway say that they restrict the activities that the borrowers can start or develop to the ones with very high returns. The argument that "poor people would not take such high interest rates loans if they were not making even higher profit" is not completely sound. Loans are taken before the event. While the average borrower may have borrowed on the basis of high expectations, there is no evidence to show that she did indeed meet those high expectations. It is equally possible that she got deep in debt and any repeat loans may be to repay the losses from the failed enterprise. The question is not only whether poor people (existing borrowers) made some profits, but also whether they could not have made more profits and the financing would have had a greater impact on these existing borrowers.
Nevertheless, these high interest rates are still most often far below what the informal lenders offer. These rates would thus be cheaper than the second best solutions that borrowers would get otherwise, therefore considered fair by many managers of MFIs. If we make a parallel with debates on wages in developing countries, this justification would be similar to the managers arguing that their low wages would be more than the inexistent social benefits unemployed workers get or, wages other workers may get in another sector or another company. A very low wage (or a high interest rate) would be justified if no better alternative exists.
When the markets are not competitive, the sustainability of the institution also matters for the current borrowers since a bankruptcy of the MFI may mean that the sole source of funds could be the even more expensive moneylenders. This financial sustainability is required both for borrowers to want to return money (if they think the MFI is not going to last, they will not repay and the MFI will indeed not last) and for commercial financing of the MFI. This argument, thus puts a lower limit on what would be an ethically sound interest rate, indicating that an interest rate below break-even point (estimated at 62% by ), would 13 go against the interest of the existing borrowers, unless subsidized donor funds for long periods are available.
Both the borrowers and the commercial investors know that donor aid is subject to fads and to herd mentality and, therefore, MFIs need to get commercial backing and be sustainable. However, this is countered by Lewis (2008) who remarks that commercial finance is also subject to herd mentality. Nevertheless, we could say that a diversified mix of the two would reduce vagaries.
A trade-off appears between the additional burden represented by the high interest on the debt to existing borrowers and the long term risk of bankruptcy. The same logic might be introduced for any event that would affect the institution sustainability and therefore justify high prices. It is thus used to defend their high profit margins. At the same time, existing borrowers could impact Compartamos by unionising and refusing to pay (as recent events in Nicaragua show 17 ).
Another argument defending high interest rates will lead us to our second stakeholders: profits would enable the impressive growth of the MFI and thus be fair to potential clients.
The second stakeholders are thus the vast amount of poor who are untapped by the traditional banks and the MFIs, the future or prospective borrowers. A main defence to Compartamos strategy is that the profits the MFI obtained from its existing borrowers has enabled it to reach potential borrowers faster. In Microfinance jargon, the impact on existing borrowers was sacrificed to increase outreach and possible impact on new borrowers.
In line with this, argues that the retained earnings were essential for financing outreach because alternatives didn't really exist. Borrowing from debt was not really feasible. They could have taken private socially responsible equity earlier, but preferred to wait to take commercial equity. This is because, with only a few large private investors, the existing NGOs would have lost control. And donors could change their mind, their capital would thus subject to fads. Thus, the high interest rates and correspondingly lower impact on existing borrowers were necessary to get outreach to new borrowers.
In this sense, potential clients might prefer higher interests since the profit margins would enable growth. However, as soon as they would become borrowers, they would prefer lower 14 interest rates. There is thus a clear trade-off between their interests. Moreover, the argument that outreach to new borrowers and impact on existing borrowers would be intrinsically incompatible holds no water. Zeller and Meyer (2002) consider that outreach, impact and financial stability form a triangle. The argument goes that helping the poor (impact) requires reaching them (outreach). However, impact is difficult to measure (Armendariz & Morduch, 2005 To apply the question to the present case, and this is the part most people have chosen to focus on: if interest rates had been lower, the impact on the poor would have been more. This relative way of looking at impact obviates the need to measure it. True, some limited impact may have occurred if they were borrowing, but the impact may also have been much greater if the interest rates were lower or if they had been partners in shareholding.
A stronger argument can be taken from credit cooperatives, where the borrowers are members of the organisation and participate in the distribution of the overall surplus. When a MFI is registered or organised as a cooperative, with members as shareholders, if the borrower pays high interest rates, and the cooperative makes high profits, a part of the earnings from high interest rates could be distributed back to the existing borrower-members. Of course, it is still possible in any form of MFI but the borrower would not take part in the decision process.
Alternatively, if the firm needs cash-flows to finance growth, the high profits can be kept as retained earnings, but a part still belongs to the borrower-member. Another argument related to the potential client is that they would be "left" to moneylenders unless a MFI offers them a microcredit. Comportamos' managers recognize that their interest rate is high but they are still a lot cheaper than the informal lenders and would thus be fair to prospective clients 19 . Getting back to the parallel with fair wage, the managers would argue that potential workers in less developed countries may be able to perform the same tasks at a While microfinance institutions often prove to be inflexible offering rigid and standardized products, moneylenders could more easily adapt their loan to the clients' needs. Hence, some researchers suggest they could remain present even when microfinance expands. They would be complementary rather than mutually exclusive to other sources of funds due to the flexibility of their financial services 21 . In addition to the price of the loan, other elements of the product-mix would be considered and appreciated by the clients. Similarly, in microfinance, many scholars argue that the most important is not the price of the loan but the access (Rosenberg, 2000) . Additionally, drawing a parallel to the moneylenders offering flexible and door to door products, Compartamos argues that it offers credit with nonfinancial services to its customers (Danel & Labarthe, 2008) , and offers some free life insurance (Rhyne & Guimon, 2007) . As a result, the free (non-)financial services drive up the cost of the loans.
This last argument is not credible for many reasons. First, a major difference between a moneylenders' business model from that of microfinance institutions is that the former never request any form of subsidies or socially-responsible funds. As a result, they do not profess socially benign motives, as opposed to donor-funded MFIs which do.
Secondly, while flexibility is one intrinsic feature of a loan, non-financial services could be easily separated from financial services. Compartamos' managers would be probably less criticised if they would let clients choose between cheaper loans with financial services and the "full package". In fact, many donors often advise managers to separate financial and nonfinancial departments of their MFI or rather use a partner NGO to provide non-financial services. This does not mean that non-financial services are useless. On the contrary, they may be very valuable for the clients and empower them (Holvoet, 2005) . But it is not sufficient for socially-responsible managers that the MFI offers these services to justify their support. If a donor has to choose between MFI A offering loans without additional service and MFI B offering similar loans but with non-financial services and three times more expensive, it will often be judicious to select the first institution and ask another NGO specialised in non-financial services to do the additional job.
Third, this does not seem to be credible according to the analysis of Compartamos profit margins which are high 22 . This leads us to the third stakeholders, the shareholders and the role they played in Compartamos' development.
As in any financial institution, the shareholders are a key stakeholder, the third one we examine. While clients have paid a high price to Compartamos, shareholders have booked significant Returns On Equity during the last years, compared not only to the microfinance industry, but also to the traditional banking standards in Mexico and Latin America. As is regularly the case in microfinance boards, Compartamos managers may have disagreed with other board members on their profit expectations. The complexity of the shareholders' structure with for-profit, non-profit and public institutional investors is a difficult issue to manage in microfinance (Labie, 2001 (Porteous, 2006) . Nevertheless, Compartamos also refused some free training or grant offered by local political bodies to remain independent. It is however not the sole institution to fear local governments.
Interference by local politicians, such as in Benin, India or Nicaragua, is increasingly feared by microfinance practitioners and makes them reluctant to accept any support forcing them to partly depend on them (CGAP, 2004) . Nevertheless, the refusal of support or grant is not ethically neutral. Taken to the extreme, we come up to the case of a MFI refusing all donation or subsidised credit line from socially-responsible investors. In order to cover the costs that these donations could cover, the institutions can either implement a very cost-effective management or increase its interest rates.
The sixth and last stakeholders we will present are the employees. Employees include workers and managers. Personnel expenses are a major cost driver in microfinance. Some
MFIs are able to offer very cheap credits because of the low salary that they offer to the largest group of their staff, the credit officer. In Compartamos' case, their high administrative costs have been highlighted a few times (Armendariz and Morduch, 2005 ). An easy explanation would then be that they have offered good salaries to their staff at the expense of the borrowers. If this analysis is correct, we could infer that the staff was one of the favoured stakeholders. Hence, the pricing policy would be fair to the employees. 20 Nevertheless, two lines of arguments can be opposed to this statement. First, the relatively poor clientele of the institution and the time-consuming loan methodology may explain part of these expenses and dismiss the argument of fair salary. Second, the turn-over of the employees and the internal debates on the wage policy, for instance when Compartamos wanted to open some more urban branches (Schlefer & Stuart, 2005) are indications that things are more complicated. Moreover, without additional information on the wage differential between the different levels of management, it is impossible to draw strong conclusions on the salaries. Kneiding and Rosenberg (2008) , for instance, report the comparatively high costs of qualified labor in Mexico.
In short, the relatively high administrative costs are a sign that staff could have been a favored stakeholder but it is difficult to draw some strong conclusions without a deeper analysis. High operating expenses could well be due to some management decisions related to incentives, salaries or training but also somewhat to some external elements such as the competition to get some skilled staff.
Ethical conclusions based on the stakeholder analysis
After the presentation of the six key stakeholders, let's get back to our original discussion on the fairness of their interest rates and summarize the key elements. The high profit margins obtained by Compartamos or, to a lesser extent his national competitors; show that the Mexican microfinance market is very profitable. Hence, the discussion can, to a large extent, be reframed in the more traditional debate on the surplus repartition between the stakeholders of a firm.
Compartamos' management argues that their growth rate enable them to reach potential borrower. Moreover, they consider that they are fair to their current borrower since their clientele has very high margins and thus benefit from the service anyway.
Two issues are at stake: the growth rate and the strategy to finance growth objectives through high interest rates. First, the growth aspiration of Compartamos managers or shareholders is not specific to this institution. The whole microfinance sector is booming, not only through the creation of Greenfield microfinance institutions but also through the impressive growth of the major MFIs. Ambitious growth objectives are regularly set by the microfinance sector in major meetings such as the Microcredit Summit Campaign. At the core of this growth is the 21 laudable decrease of financial exclusion and thus the potential borrowers. One could however question if poor clients could be the ones bearing the burdens of expansion financed by the high profit margins made on their backs. If growth must be partly at the expense of current borrowers, it must be carefully managed. In some difficult situations where no other financing strategies are possible, a more gradual growth would be less controversial.
The second issue concerns the financing strategies. Many surveys confirm that the largest
MFIs can now access cheap funds from commercial or semi-commercial investors. In
Compartamos case, other financing strategies may probably have been developed.
Compartamos had access to the international financial market, as suggested by its successful bonds issue. Managers could have relied on local or international commercial funds or on socially-responsible investment funds largely interested in microfinance and most often without interest rates restriction. In short, their financing strategy was not socially neutral.
Erroneously assuming that the market would undeniably force them to decrease rapidly their rates, donors or regulators did not directly intervene in this repartition of the surplus, for instance through a covenant in their contract on the interest rates. Moreover, by restricting competition with a very defensive regulatory framework, regulators may have favoured the "rent" of Compartamos managers and shareholders. Similarly, donors may well have believed too much in the emergence of competitors or the willingness of the managers to decrease interest rates.
Shareholders ended up being favoured by the interest rate policy. The portfolio growth has enabled to serve new clients but also to make Compartamos more attractive to commercial investors and thus increase the benefits of the shareholders. argued that « All other things being equal, if Compartamos profits had been two-thirds less (still at a robust level around 20% annual return on initial equity), one would expect the IPO shares to have sold for a price two-thirds lower".
This leads us to the main element in the stakeholder analysis which is related to the type of IPO. Compartamos IPO was not a capital increase, enabling it to finance its growth, but the sale of existing shares where the returns go directly to the shareholders. On the one hand, since the money is not reinvested to finance new activities of Compartamos, it has some very limited impact on existing or potential client, or for employees. While potential borrowers 22 may have directly benefited from a capital increase if the profits had been reallocated to investment and new lending, it is clearly not the case with a sale of existing shares.
On the other hand, the sale of shares benefits the historical shareholders of Compartamos and might even negatively impact existing borrowers with the entry of more commercial shareholders such as the hedge funds. We will address the conflict between the various shareholders in the next section.
Ethical issues raised in the governance of microfinance institutions in particular and

NGOs in general when shareholders have different missions
In this section, we are studying the case but often we are going beyond the case to broader questions of ethics and governance. Governance has different definitions, but in the microfinance context, it generally includes issues such as mission, boards, donors, regulation, apex associations, competition, mismatch in liability/assets and the influence of local communities and regulators (Hartarska, 2005; Labie, 2001 Labie, , 2003 Mersland, 2008) . As we can see, this is a complicated case involving complex governance issues. The principal agency problems were highlighted in Figure 1 . There are a number of principal agency relationships, including sub-agents. However, this fact alone does not raise ethical questions, except that, at each stage, the questions posed can be different. Before addressing these issues, we will first question the mission of some non-profit or socially-oriented institutions offering financial services.
Ethical issues related to missions of NGOs
Ethical problems relating to the mission of microcredit NGOs have been discussed for some time (Copestake, 2007; Mersland & Strom, 2008; Morduch, 1999) recognize different kinds of mission drifts. They examine one of them: is the size of average loan increasing, implying a drift to not-so-poor borrowers? They find no evidence of this. Mersland (2008) A first problem, within the field of deontological ethics rather than teleological ethics is related to mission conflict: whether NGOs should create for-profit entities. As pointed out earlier, NGOs use contractual relationships with for-profits all the time. However, this is an arms-length relation. In this case, the NGO had created a controllable for-profit organization.
Thus, the ethical issues are not the same because the principal-agency relationship is different.
It may be noticed that this is exactly the inverse problem to the one being debated in
Corporate Social Responsibility where Friedman (1970) feels that the managers are misappropriating funds by distributing them as donations: if shareholders wanted to give donations, they could do so from the dividends they receive. This issue also has reverberations in the Grameen Danone case (Yunus & Weber, 2007) : Muhammad Yunus wants to create social businesses in which the investors get a zero return. However, Danone wants to be careful to get at least a 1 to 3% return, to show that it is balancing economic and social goals at the same time. 25 As such, the debate is wider than the narrow debate of whether In order to better analyse the board dynamics, we will thus analyse the problems or challenges caused by each of these four groups of shareholders, indicated above.
First, we take the case of minority private shareholders: a main challenge for an institution facing an overlapping of deontological and teleological ethics is created by the presence of minority private shareholders. If all the shareholders had been not-for-profits, the problem of capital gains would not have arisen because all the gains should have gone back for developmental objectives. However, if minority private shareholders gain, the question comes in whether the minority wasn't, in fact, controlling the majority to ensure that impact on poor people was sacrificed so that the majority NGOs could have peace of mind through viability.
Private shareholders would also gain from the ultimate capital gains (increase in book value AND increase in market value). Thus, what is being questioned is the end result "did private shareholders gain?" Nevertheless, this teleological question would not have been posed if there were no NGOs involved. So, the question is deontological: "did private shareholders unduly benefit from the distribution of public funds"?
An alternative question is why an NGO included minority shareholders to start with. The NGO itself is a piece of paper, managed by real people. What is the relationship of these directors of the NGO with the outside shareholders?
There is a lot of literature, legislation and court decisions on minority interests and rights.
These rights have a semiotic correspondence to duties of majority shareholders to preserve 26 values for minority. In this legislative and cultural context, could the NGO majority shareholders have done otherwise than to maximise profits for the minority private holders?
Would it have been ethical for NGOs to sacrifice the profits of the minority private shareholders just to ensure its own mission? Thus, existing laws in other fields (minority interests in for-profit organizations) may make NGOs respect rights of minorities even when those minorities have come in knowing fully well the social objectives of the venture.
Second, we look at the problems created by the presence of founder shareholders: this problem concerns a specific type of shareholder who could be in majority or in minority, the founder of a company. It is recognized that at some stage, in a for-profit context, that founders need to exit to make room for more suitable managers in view of the growth stage of the firm.
These founding shareholders would exit through a sale of their shares. ACCION (Rhyne & Guimon, 2007) However, when the invested money belongs to not-for-profits, do they have the right to make a profit? The question goes back, as CGAP put it, to the time when the not-for-profit entered the MFI. As such, we go back to the initial question above of whether a not-for-profit should invest in shares at all? Does the not-for-profit have the right to make money on its portfolio?
Can it maintain the value of portfolios by investing in shares and, if not, can it invest in bonds? If so, does maintaining value include participating in governance of the targeted companies? How about participating in managements? Thus, the ethics of pension fund governance of for-profit firms also needs to be examined. Finally, we examine employee shareholders: Another problem is the problem of incentives through employee shareholding, particularly with the managers. Employee shareholding with directors and managers is one of the favourite tools of private equity to boost performance.
However, in a setting of NGO missions to aid the poor, the objective of the employees (agents) gets aligned with profits and shareholder "value", not shareholder "values", where the latter concerns the professed value of the majority NGO shareholders. Again, it is the deontological misalignment which is being questioned.
Conclusion
The normal critique of the Compartamos case is framed in a deontological-teleological framework. If we adopt a Friedman (1962 Friedman ( , 1970 based governance principle where the only objective of a profit making Compartamos would be to make profits while respecting laws, it is evident that the consequence of Compartamos behaviour is clearly meritorious. If, however, we enlarge the governance dimension to include ethical and discretionary dimensions (Carroll, 1979) , then the social consciousness based deontology opens the debate as to whether profits justify exploiting the poorest. In the paper we mentioned that ethics shape laws, but are also shaped by existing laws and beliefs. We gave an example of the latter concerning minority interests and rights. The heated debate on the Compartamos IPO has culminated in a first step taken: On April 21-23 2008, some leading microfinance personalities signed "The Pocantico Declaration" at the Microfinance Leaders Retreat. This is a step toward a self imposed voluntary code of deontology. So, the experience and the ethical debate have led to new lessons and some action based on these. It is still doubtful today to say that this level of self regulation will be sufficient to address the various challenges raised in the paper.
Many of the key questions of governance go beyond microfinance to all institutions dealing with social justice. The paper also has not gone into the reverse area: should for-profit businesses invest in not-for-profits? The ethical issues are the same as summarised in corporate social responsibility and corporate philanthropy: what are the ethics of managers (who are the agents) who decide to put their firm's money into not-for-profit channels?
It raises ethical questions and is a bonanza for future research to reply to these questions. We believe the raising of these questions, explicitly and clearly, is necessary for this debate and for further regulation of microcredit in particular and NGOs in general.
